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CONTINUED FRACTIONS AND RSA WITH SMALL
SECRET EXPONENT
ANDREJ DUJELLA
Abstract. Extending the classical Legendre’s result, we describe all
solutions of the inequality |α − a/b| < c/b2 in terms of convergents
of continued fraction expansion of α. Namely, we show that a/b =
(rpm+1±spm)/(rqm+1±sqm) for some nonnegative integers m, r, s such
that rs < 2c. As an application of this result, we describe a modifi-
cation of Verheul and van Tilborg variant of Wiener’s attack on RSA
cryptosystem with small secret exponent.
1. Introduction
The most popular public key cryptosystem in use today is the RSA [14].
Its security is based on the difficulty of finding the prime factors of large
integers.
The modulus n of a RSA cryptosystem is the product of two large primes
p and q. The public exponent e and the secret exponent d are related by
ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(n)), where ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) = n − p − q + 1. In a
typical RSA cryptosystem p and q have approximately the same number of
bits, and e < n. The encryption and decryption algorithms are given by
C =M e mod n, M = Cd mod n.
To speed up the RSA encryption or decryption one may try to use small
public or secret decryption exponent. The choice of a small e or d is espe-
cially interesting when there is a large difference in computing power between
two communicating devices, e.g. in communication between a smart card
and a larger computer. In this situation, it would be desirable for the smart
card to have a small secret exponent, and for the larger computer to have
a small public exponent in order to reduce the processing required in the
smart card.
However, in 1990 Wiener [17] described an attack on a typical RSA with
small secret exponent. He showed that if d < n0.25, then d is the denom-
inator of some convergent of the continued fraction expansion of e/n, and
therefore d can be computed efficiently from the public key (n, e). His result
is based on the classical Legendre’s theorem on Diophantine approxima-
tions of the form |α − a
b
| < 1
2b2
. Pinch [13] extended the attack to some
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other cryptosystems. In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg proposed an exten-
sion of Wiener’s attack that allows the RSA cryptosystem to be broken by
an exhaustive search when d is a few bits longer than n0.25.
In this paper, we will generalize Legendre’s result to Diophantine approx-
imations of the form |α− a
b
| < c
b2
. We will show that this result leads to the
more efficient variant of the above mentioned attacks.
Our attack on RSA will closely follow Wiener’s ideas, but let us very
briefly mention some other attacks on RSA with small exponent d. In 1999,
Boneh and Durfee [3] proposed an attack on RSA with small secret exponent
which is based on Coppersmith’s lattice-based technique for finding small
roots of bivariate modular polynomial equation [4]. The attack works if
d < n0.292. Similar attack was proposed Blo¨mer and May if d < n0.29.
Recently, it was noted by Hinek, Low and Teske [8] (see also [7]) that these
theoretical bounds on d are not correct (some quantity which appears in the
analysis is not negligible). Also, it should be noted that the Coppersmith’s
theorem is for univariate case; in the bivariate case it is only a heuristic
result for now. On the other hand, it seems that these attacks work well in
practice.
2. Wiener’s attack on RSA
In 1990, Wiener [17] described a polynomial time algorithm for breaking a
typical (i.e. p and q are of the same size and e < n) RSA cryptosystem if the
secret exponent d has at most one-quarter as many bits as the modulus n.
The Wiener’s attack is usually described in the following form (see [2, 15]):
If p < q < 2p, e < n and d < 13
4
√
n, then d is the denominator of a
convergent of the continued fraction expansion of e
n
.
The starting point is the basic relation between exponents
ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(n)).
This means that there is an integer k such that ed − kϕ(n) = 1. Now,
ϕ(n) ≈ n implies k
d
≈ e
n
. More precisely, we have n− 3√n < ϕ(n) < n and
∣∣∣k
d
− e
n
∣∣∣ < 3k
d
√
n
<
1
2d2
.
Hence, by Legendre’s theorem, k
d
is a convergent of continued fraction ex-
pansion of e
n
.
If [a0; a1, a2, ...] is the continued fraction expansion of a real number α,
then the convergents
pj
qj
satisfy p0 = a0, q0 = 1, p1 = a0a1 + 1, q1 = a1,
pi = aipi−1 + pi−2,
qi = aiqi−1 + qi−2.
Therefore, the denominators grow exponentially. This means that total
number of convergents of e
n
is of order O(log n). If a convergent can be tested
in polynomial time, this will give us a polynomial algorithm to determine d.
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Wiener proposed the following method for testing convergents. Let a
b
be a
convergent of e
n
. If it is the correct guess for k
d
, than ϕ(n) can be computed
from ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q− 1) = (be− 1)/a. Now we can compute p+q2 from the
identity
pq − (p − 1)(q − 1) + 1
2
=
p+ q
2
,
and q−p2 from the identity (
p+q
2 )
2 − pq = ( q−p2 )2. If the numbers p+q2 and
q−p
2 , obtained by these identities, are positive integers, then the convergent
a
b
is correct guess for k
d
. We can also recover easily p and q from p+q2 and
q−p
2 .
Another possibility for detecting the correct convergent is by testing which
one gives a d which satisfies (M e)d =M (mod n) for some random value of
M .
Example 1. Let n = 7978886869909, e = 3594320245477, and assume that
d < 561. Continued fraction expansion of e
n
is
[0; 2, 4, 1, 1, 4, 1, 2, 31, 21, 1, 3, 1, 16, 3, 1, 114, 10, 1, 4, 5, 1, 2],
and the convergents are
0,
1
2
,
4
9
,
5
11
,
9
20
,
41
91
,
50
111
,
141
313
,
4421
9814
, . . . .
Applying test (2e)d ≡ 2 (mod n), we obtain d = 313. Of course, the same
result can be obtained with the original Wiener’s test. For a
b
= 141313 we
find p+q2 = 2878805,
q−p
2 = 555546, and this yields the factorization n =
2323259 · 3434351
We have seen in the previous example that the correct convergent was the
last convergent with denominator less than 13
4
√
n. This suggests that perhaps
it is not necessary to test all convergents. We will justify this assertion.
To do that, we need more precise estimate of |k
d
− e
n
|, which corresponds
to better approximation of ϕ(n). Assume that p < q < 2p. Then (p+q)
2
n
=
2 + p
2+q2
pq
and thus 2
√
n < p+ q < 3
√
2
2
√
n < 2.1214
√
n. This implies
k
d
− e
n
=
k(p+ q)− k − 1
dn
>
2k(
√
n− 1)
dn
.
Since k
d
> e
n
· n
n−2√n+1 , we obtain
(1)
k
d
− e
n
>
2e
n
√
n
.
In the opposite direction we have
k
d
− e
n
<
2.1214k
d
√
n
.
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We may assume that n > 108. Then k
d
< 1.00023 e
n
, and finally
(2)
k
d
− e
n
<
2.122 e
n
√
n
.
Similarly we find that
k
d
− e
n
<
3.183 e
n
√
n
if p < q < 8p.
In the rest of the paper we will work under the assumption that p < q <
2p, but the arguments can be easily modified to the case p < q < 8p.
From (1) and (2) we may conclude that k
d
is unique (odd) convergent
satisfying
2e
n
√
n
<
k
d
− e
n
<
2.122 e
n
√
n
.
Indeed, this follows from the fact that if pm/qm and pm+2/qm+2 are two
successive (odd) convergents of a real number α, then pm+2/qm+2 at least
twice better approximation of α than pm/qm, which is direct consequence of
the following well-known property of convergents (see [9, Theorems 9 and
13])
(3)
1
qm(qm+1 + qm)
<
∣∣∣α− pm
qm
∣∣∣ < 1
qmqm+1
.
Furthermore, if k
d
= pm
qm
, then
n
√
n
4.244e
< qmqm+1 <
n
√
n
2e
,
and m is the unique odd positive integer satisfying this inequality. This
observations lead to an efficient algorithm for finding the correct convergent
in the Wiener’s attack. Namely, k
d
= pm
qm
, where m is the smallest odd
positive integer such that qmqm+1 >
n
√
n
4.244e .
As suggested in the original Wiener’s paper, the attack can be slightly
improved by using better approximation to k
d
, e.g. e
f
, where f = n −
⌊2√n⌋ + 1. This can be combined with known extensions of Legendre’s
theorem. Namely, there is an old result of Fatou [6] (see also [11, p. 16])
which says that if |α − a
b
| < 1
b2
, then a
b
= pm
qm
or pm+1±pm
qm+1±qm . In 1981, Worley
[18] (see also [5] and [12]) proved that |α− a
b
| < 2
b2
implies a
b
= pm
qm
, pm+1±pm
qm+1±qm ,
2pm+1±pm
2qm+1±qm ,
3pm+1+pm
3qm+1+qm
, pm+1±2pm
qm+1±2qm or
pm+1−3pm
qm+1−3qm .
We have
0 <
k
d
− e
f
<
0.1221√
n
.
If d < 4.04 4
√
n, then 0.1221√
n
< 2
d2
and d can be found in polynomial time
(which extends the Wiener’s attack by the factor 12).
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More general extensions of Wiener’s attack will be considered in next
sections.
3. Verheul and van Tilborg variant of Wiener’s attack
In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg [16] proposed the following extension of
Wiener’s attack.
Let m be the largest (odd) integer satisfying pm
qm
− e
n
> 2.122 e
n
√
n
. Search for
k
d
between fractions of the form rpm+1+spm
rqm+1+sqm
, i.e. consider the system
rpm+1 + spm = k
rqm+1 + sqm = d.
The determinant of the system satisfies |pm+1qm− qm+1pm| = 1, and there-
fore the system has (positive) integer solutions:
r = dpm − kqm
s = kqm+1 − dpm+1.
If r and s are small, then they can be found by an exhaustive search.
Let us estimate the number of steps in this exhaustive search, i.e. let us
find upper bounds for r and s. Let d = D 4
√
n.
From (3) it follows r = dqm
(
pm
qm
− k
d
)
< d
qm+1
. The estimate for s depends
on the sign of the number e
n
− pm+1
qm+1
− 2.122e
n
√
n
. (We may expect that this number
will be positive in 50% of the cases.) Assume that e
n
− pm+1
qm+1
> 2.122e
n
√
n
. Then
s = dqm+1
(k
d
− pm+1
qm+1
)
< 2dqm+1
( e
n
− pm+1
qm+1
)
<
2d
qm+2
.
Since
1
q2m+2(am+3 + 2)
<
pm+2
qm+2
− e
n
<
2.122e
n
√
n
<
2.122√
n
,
we have
qm+2 >
4
√
n√
2.122(am+3 + 2)
.
Also, qm+1 >
qm+2
am+2+1
. Putting all these estimates together we obtain
r <
√
2.122(am+3 + 2)(am+2 + 1)D,
s <
√
2.122(am+3 + 2)D.
Hence, in this case the number of steps is bounded by
2.122(am+3 + 2)(am+2 + 1)D
2.
Assume now that e
n
− pm+1
qm+1
≤ 2.122e
n
√
n
. Then
s = dqm+1
(k
d
− pm+1
qm+1
)
< dqm+1
(pm
qm
− pm+1
qm+1
)
=
d
qm
.
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Since in this case is already pm+1
qm+1
close enough to e
n
, we have the estimate
for qm+1 which is analogous to the estimate for qm+2 in the previous case:
qm+1 >
4
√
n√
2.122(am+2 + 2)
.
This implies
r <
√
2.122(am+2 + 2)D,
s <
√
2.122(am+2 + 2)(am+1 + 1)D
and in this case the number of steps is bounded by
2.122(am+2 + 2)(am+1 + 1)D
2.
In [16], the authors propose that with reasonable probability (20%) the
number of steps can be bounded by 256D2. It is indeed true if we have in
mind that partial quotients ai’s are usually very small. In [10, p. 352] the
distribution of the partial quotients of a random real number α is given.
Approximately, ai will be 1 with probability 41.5%, ai = 2 with probability
17.0%, ai = 3 with probability 9.3%, ai = 4 with probability 5.9%, etc. Our
analysis shows that the success of Verheul and van Tilborg attack (when D2
is of reasonable size) depends heavily on the size of corresponding partial
quotients am+1, am+2 and am+3. And although they are usually small, we
cannot exclude the possibility that at least one of them is large (see Examples
2 and 3). Namely, the probability that ai ≥ x is equal to log2(1 + 1x), and
this is a slowly decreasing function.
In Section 5 we will propose a method how to overcome this problem and
remove the dependence on partial quotients. A general result on Diophantine
approximation from the next section will allow us to obtain more precise
information on r and s which will reduce the number of steps in the search.
4. Extension of Legendre’s theorem
Theorem 1. Let α be an irrational number and let a, b be coprime nonzero
integers, satisfying the inequality
(4)
∣∣∣α− a
b
∣∣∣ < c
b2
,
where c is a positive real number. Then (a, b) = (rpm+1±spm, rqm+1±sqm),
for some nonnegative integers m, r and s such that rs < 2c.
Proof. Assume that α < a
b
, the other case is completely analogous. Let
m be the largest odd integer satisfying
α <
a
b
≤ pm
qm
.
If a
b
> p1
q1
, we will take m = −1, following the convention that p−1 = 1,
q−1 = 0.
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Let us define the numbers r and s by:
a = rpm+1 + spm,
b = rqm+1 + sqm.
Since |pm+1qm − pmqm+1| = 1, we conclude that r and s are integers, and
since pm+1
qm+1
< a
b
≤ pm
qm
, we have that r ≥ 0 and s > 0.
From the maximality of m, we have that∣∣∣pm+2
qm+2
− a
b
∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣α− a
b
∣∣∣ < c
b2
.
But∣∣∣pm+2
qm+2
− a
b
∣∣∣ = (am+2qm+1+qm)(rpm+1+spm)− (am+2pm+1+pm)(rqm+1+sqm)
bqm+2
=
sam+2 − r
bqm+2
.
Therefore, we obtain
b(sam+2 − r) < cqm+2 = c
s
((sam+2 − r)qm+1 + b),
which implies
(sam+2 − r)(b− c
s
qm+1) <
c
s
b.
Furthermore we have
1
sam+2 − r >
b− c
s
qm+1
c
s
b
=
s
c
− 1
r + sqm
qm+1
≥ s
c
− 1
r
.
Therefore, we obtain the following inequality
(5) r2 − sram+2 + cam+2 > 0.
We will consider (5) as a quadratic inequality in r.
Assume for a moment that s2am+2 ≥ 4c. Then s4a2m+2 − 4cs2am+2 ≥
(s2am+2 − 4c)2, and therefore (5) implies
r <
1
2s
(
s2am+2 −
√
s4a2m+2 − 4cs2am+2
)
≤ 2c
s
,
or
r >
1
2s
(
s2am+2 +
√
s4a2m+2 − 4cs2am+2
)
≥ 1
s
(
s2am+2 − 2c).
The first possibility gives us the condition rs < 2c, as claimed in the theorem.
Let us consider the second possibility, i.e.
(6) rs > s2am+2 − 2c.
Let us define t = sam+2−r. Since pm+2qm+2 < ab , we conclude that t is a positive
integer. Now we have
a = rpm+1 + spm = (sam+2 − t)pm+1 + spm = spm+2 − tpm+1,
b = rqm+1 + sqm = (sam+2 − t)qm+1 + sqm = sqm+2 − tqm+1,
and the condition (6) becomes st < 2c.
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Hence we proved the statement of the theorem under assumption that
s2am+2 ≥ 4c.
Assume now that s2am+2 < 4c. Since r < sam+2, we have two possibil-
ities. If r < 12sam+2, then rs <
1
2s
2an+2 < 2c, and if r ≥ 12sam+2, then
t = sam+2 − r ≤ 12sam+2 and st ≤ 12s2am+2 < 2c.

Remark 1. It is not clear from the proof whether above theorem is valid for
rationals a
b
such that a
b
< p0
q0
= ⌊α⌋. But this case corresponds to the minus
case with m = 0 is the statement of the theorem. Indeed, let s
r
= ⌊α⌋ − a
b
.
Then a
b
= p0 − sr = rp0−sr = rp0−sp−1rq0−sq−1 , and rs = b2 · sr < b2 · cb2 = c.
Remark 2. The statement of the theorem is valid also for rational numbers
α. Indeed, if α ∈ Q, then there exist an integer j ≥ 0 such that α = pj
qj
.
The proof is identical as in the irrational case, unless α < a
b
<
pj−1
qj−1
(or
α > a
b
>
pj−1
qj−1
). If we define positive integers r and s by
a = rpj + spj−1,
b = rqj + sqj−1,
then the inequalities
∣∣∣α− ab
∣∣∣ = sbqj < cb2 and b > rqj imply rsqj < sb < cqj,
and finally rs < c.
Similar result as our Theorem 1 was proved, with different methods, by
Worley. In [18, Theorem 1], it was shown that there are three types of
solutions of the inequality (4). Two types correspond to + and − signs in
(rpm+1±spm, rqm+1±sqm), while Theorem 1 shows that the third type can
be omitted.
Theorem 1 extends results for c = 1 and c = 2 cited in Section 2. The
result for c = 2 has already found applications in solving some Diophantine
equations. In [12], it is applied to the problem of finding positive integers
a and b such that (a2 + b2)/(ab + 1) is an integer, and in [5] it is used for
solving the family of Thue inequalities
|x4 − 4cx3y + (6c+ 2)x2y2 + 4cxy2 + y4| ≤ 6c+ 4.
We hope that Theorem 1 will also find its application in Diophantine anal-
ysis.
5. A variant of Wiener’s attack
In this section we propose new variant of Wiener’s attack. It is very
similar to Verheul and van Tilborg attack, but instead of exhaustive search
after finding the appropriate starting convergent, this new variant also uses
estimates which follow from Diophantine approximation (Theorem 1).
CONTINUED FRACTIONS AND RSA 9
Let m be the largest (odd) integer such that
pm
qm
>
e
n
+
2.122e
n
√
n
.
We have two possibilities depending on whether the inequality pm+2
qm+2
≥ k
d
is
satisfied or not.
Assume first that pm+2
qm+2
≥ k
d
. We are searching for k
d
among the fractions
of the form r
′pm+3+s′pm+2
r′qm+3+s′qm+2
. As in Section 3, we have
qm+2 >
4
√
n√
2.122(am+3 + 2)
.
Now we have
r′ = dqm+2
(pm+2
qm+2
− k
d
)
< dqm+2 · 0.122e
n
√
n
< 0.061dqm+2
(pm+2
qm+2
− e
n
)
< 0.061
d
qm+3
<
0.061
√
2.122(am+3 + 2)
am+3
D
and
s′ = dqm+3
(k
d
− pm+3
qm+3
)
≤ dqm+3
(pm+2
qm+2
− pm+3
qm+3
)
=
d
qm+2
<
√
2.122(am+3 + 2)D.
Hence, k
d
can be recovered in at most r′s′ < 0.1295(am+3+2)
am+3
D2 ≤ 0.3885D2
steps. Here D = d/ 4
√
n, as before.
Assume now that pm+2
qm+2
< k
d
. We have
k
d
− e
n
<
2.122e
n
√
n
<
2.122√
n
=
2.122D2
d2
.
We are in the conditions of the proof of Theorem 1, and we conclude that
k
d
=
rpm+1 + spm
rqm+1 + sqm
or
k
d
=
spm+2 − tpm+1
sqm+2 − tqm+1 , where r, s and t are positive
integers satisfying rs < 4.244D2, st < 4.244D2.
From the Dirichlet’s formula for the number of divisors we obtain im-
mediately that the number of possible pairs (r, s) and (s, t) is O(D2 logD).
However, r and s (resp. s and t) are not arbitrary. They satisfy the in-
equalities r < am+2s and t < am+2s, which imply r < 2.061
√
am+2D
and t < 2.061
√
am+2D. In Section 3 we found that s ≤ s1, where s1 =
⌊
√
2.122(am+2 + 2)D⌋ if e
n
− pm+1
qm+1
>
2.122e
n
√
n
, and s1 = ⌊
√
2.122(am+2 + 2)
(am+1 + 1)D⌋ if e
n
− pm+1
qm+1
≤ 2.122e
n
√
n
. Let s0 =
⌊
2.061
D√
am+2
⌋
. We have
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the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs (r, s):
am+2(1 + 2 + · · ·+ s0) + D
2
s0 + 1
+
D2
s0 + 2
+ · · ·+ D
2
s1
< am+2s
2
0 +D
2(log
s1
s0 + 1
+ 1)
< 5.248D2 +D2 log(0.707max(
√
(am+3+2)am+2, (am+2+1)(am+1+1))).
We have the same upper bound for the number of possible pairs (s, t).
Hence, the number of steps in this attack is O(D2 logA) (A = max{ai :
i = m+1,m+2,m+3}). We may compare this with Verheul & van Tilborg
attack where the number of steps was O(D2A2).
Example 2. Let n = 7978886869909, e = 4603830998027, and assume that
d < 10000000. Continued fraction expansion of e
n
is
[0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 18, 10, 1, 3, 3, 1, 6, 57, 2, 1, 2, 14, 7, 1, 2, 1, 4, 6, 2],
and the convergents are
0, 1,
1
2
,
3
5
,
4
7
,
11
19
,
15
26
,
281
487
,
2825
4896
, . . . .
We find that
281
487
<
e
n
+
2.122e
n
√
n
<
11
19
.
Hence m = 5 and we are searching for the secret exponent among the
numbers of the form 26r+19s or 487s− 26t or 4896r′ +487s′. By applying
Wiener’s test, we find that s = 12195, t = 77 gives the correct value for d,
d = 5936963.
Let us compare these numbers s and t with the numbers r and s obtained
by an application of the Verheul and van Tilborg attack to the same problem.
We obtain the same number s = 12195, but the other number r = 219433 is
much larger than t = 77, which is in a good agreement with our theoretical
estimates.
Example 3. Let us take n = 7978886869909 again. For 1000 ≤ d ≤
1000000, we compare the quantities rs, obtained by Verheul and van Tilborg
attack, with the quantity D2. The maximal value for rs/D2 is 78464.2 and
it is attained for d = 611131. There are 591 d’s for which rs/D2 is greater
than 1000. The average value of rs/D2 for d in the given interval is 15.69.
Similar analysis for the attack introduced in this section gives that the
average value of the quantity min(rs, st, r′s′)/D2 for d in interval 1000 ≤
d ≤ 1000000 is 0.8397, with maximal value 4.026 attained for d = 437561.
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